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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
SCARFIELD V. MUNTJAN: A JURY DEMAND IN AN
AMENDED COMPLAINT, WHICH IS DISMISSED FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, DOES NOT REVIVE A
PREVIOUSLY WAIVED JURY DEMAND FOR COUNTS IN
THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT.
By: Thomas Andrew Barnes
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that, while a waived jury trial may
be revived by an amended complaint in which new and substantive issues are
raised, the dismissal of a new count raised in an amended complaint will not
revive the originally waived demand for jury trial. Scarfield v. Muntjan, 444
Md. 264, 266, 276-77, 119 A.3d 745, 746, 752 (2015).
The instant case arises from a dispute between a tenant, Peter Muntjan
(“Muntjan”), and his landlord, Frank Scarfield (“Scarfield”). In 2007,
Scarfield filed a complaint against Muntjan alleging he held over on his lease.
The District Court of Maryland, sitting in Baltimore County, ordered a Writ
of Possession to be issued and executed by the county sheriff. Muntjan was
evicted on December 19, 2007.
Muntjan filed a pro se complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
three years later. He alleged one count of trover and conversion ("Count I")
and one count of invasion of privacy ("Count II") in relation to the 2007
ejectment and repossession. Scarfield filed a motion to dismiss Count II,
which the circuit court granted in September 2011, on the basis that the statute
of limitations lapsed. Scarfield filed his answer to Count I in October, without
a jury demand. Muntjan failed to file a jury demand within 15 days of
Scarfield’s answer. Then, in April 2012, Muntjan filed an amended complaint
which reasserted Counts I and II, added a third for abuse of process ("Count
III"), and demanded a jury trial.
Scarfield replied to Muntjan's amended complaint and jury demand by
filing a motion to strike. His motion was denied, but the circuit court did not
make a ruling on the jury demand. Scarfield later filed a motion to dismiss
Counts II and III for failure to state a claim, and renewed his motion to strike
the jury demand. He asserted that the jury demand was ineffective because it
was not filed within 15 days of service of the last pleading, pursuant to Md.
Rule 2-325(b). Additionally, Scarfield argued that an amended complaint is
not a pleading as defined in Maryland Rule 1-202 (defining a pleading as a
complaint, a counterclaim, a cross-claim, a third-party complaint, or as an
answer to any of the aforementioned documents).
The circuit court ruled that an amended complaint is a pleading under
Maryland Rule 1-202, but reasoned that permitting a plaintiff to demand a jury
trial at any time would defeat the “orderly process” established in Maryland
Rule 2-325(a) and (b). However, the court recognized one possible exception
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– a jury demand would be entertained if an amended complaint added a new
claim which did not prejudice the opposing party. The court concluded that
Count III was too closely related to Count I, and held that Muntjan could not
revive the jury demand because the amended complaint did not raise a new
claim. Muntjan appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
The intermediate appellate court made two relevant rulings. First, the court
determined that the circuit court correctly dismissed Count III, finding that an
abuse of process claim based on the initial eviction does not actually state a
cause of action for abuse of process. Second, the circuit court erred in denying
the jury demand because the amended complaint in this case did raise a new
issue. “Muntjan’s claim for [a]buse of [p]rocess was based on a separate set
of facts involving appellees’ purpose in initiating the eviction,” entitling
Muntjan to a remand for jury trial. Scarfield appealed to the Court of Appeals
of Maryland, which granted certiorari.
Maryland's highest court examined the intermediate appellate court's
decision de novo because the questions presented were a matter of law.
Scarfield, 444 Md. at 270, 119 A.3d at 748. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
established the foundation of its discussion by stating that the Maryland Rules
must be construed to be simple and fair, promoting the efficient and ordered
administration of justice. Id. at 270-71, 119 A.3d at 748-49 (citing Md. Rule
1-201(a)). Maryland Rule 2-325 provides that a party waives its right to jury
trial when it fails to file a demand within 15 days after service of the last
pleading. Id. at 271-72, 119 A.3d 749 (citing Md. Rule 2-325).
Muntjan failed to file a demand for jury trial within 15 days of service of
the last pleading after the original complaint. Scarfield, 444 Md. at 272, 119
A.3d at 749. However, he included a jury demand to accompany Count III in
an amended complaint. Id. The high circuit court dismissed Count III for
failure to state a claim which the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
affirmed. Id. at 273, 199 A.3d at 750. This resulted in a demand for jury trial
attached to an amended complaint that did not add new counts. Id.
The court of appeals rejected Scarfield’s argument that an amended
complaint is not a pleading within Rule 1-202. Scarfield, 444 Md. at 272, 119
A.3d at 750. The court found the circuit court’s reasoning persuasive, that “an
amended complaint is a pleading in the sense that it [is] an amendment of a
pleading.” Id. at 273, 119 A.3d at 750. However, the court accepted
Scarfield’s argument that Count III was not a “triable right by jury” because it
was dismissed for failure to state a claim. Id.
Neither the Maryland rules nor case law define a “triable of right by a jury.”
Scarfield, 444 Md. at 274, 119 A.3d at 751. Triable of right by a jury
traditionally “refers to whether an action was triable by a jury at common law.”
Id. (citing Luppino v. Gray, 336 Md. 194, 201, 647 A.2d 429, 432 (1994)).
The Maryland Rules Commentary is in agreement such that “a demand filed
with an amended complaint whose only new count is equitable in nature will
not be granted.” Id. The court acknowledges examples where prior courts
found the determinative factor to be “whether the new count was only
duplicative of previous counts.” Id. at 275, 119 A.3d at 751. Here, Count III

146

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 46.2

failed to state a claim and as a result did not present a claim “triable of right
by a jury.” Id. at 276, 119 A.3d at 752.
In further support, the court emphasized that Rule 2-325's causal efficacy
would be rendered meaningless if parties were able to revive waived jury
demands simply by demanding a jury trial in any amended complaint.
Scarfield, 444 Md. at 276-77, 119 A.3d at 752. The judgment of the court of
special appeals was reversed and remanded. Id. at 277, 119 A.3d at 752.
In Scarfield, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a waived jury
demand cannot be revived by an amended complaint if the new counts are
dismissed for failure to state a claim. The intent of the Maryland Rules is to
provide a legal structure that is as simple, fair, and swift as possible, while
costing no more than necessary. These rules are kept efficient by reversing
the intermediate court's judgment. No longer can erroneous or fruitless
amended complaints be filed in order to revive a waived jury trial – even if
such amended complaints are filed in good faith. However, this decision now
incentivizes attorneys to demand jury trials with their original complaints,
knowing that they cannot so easily be revived later. What might have been a
one-day bench trial may now take two or three, given even a short voir dire
can take an entire morning. Though it would not necessarily approach the
threshold of a 6th Amendment violation, even by adding only one day to every
trial, the notion of a "speedy trial" will become much less so. This judgment
may also impose a greater financial burden on the state. While the salary of
the judges, clerks, and administrative assistants are fixed, there will be a
greater demand for jurors, who are paid hourly and provided a daily lunch
stipend. Lastly, even if attorneys practicing in Maryland do not demand a
greater number of jury trials, this introduces a free rider problem. There will
always be the small group of outliers who know that, so long as the majority
of their peers follow economically efficient and socially ethical behavior, their
own contrary behavior will go unnoticed.

